There is still a State in Spain

It's been a year since Carles Puigdemont clandestinely entered Spain, intending to attend the investiture session of the president of the Generalitat of Catalonia, Salvador Illa. After appearing for a few minutes on a puppet stage to greet a few dozen supporters, Puigdemont escaped again. It was his second escape, which further underscored the lack of epic spirit in his victimhood narrative and his outburst of independence. And, of course, he made his personal cowardice public, clearly outlined by the consistency of those who, just as responsible as he was for the crimes committed on October 1, 2017, stayed and assumed the consequences of their actions, with convictions and imprisonment, even though they were later granted pardons and amnesties. Such a figure, in principle, has little political clout. Puigdemont is only relevant to the extent that Pedro Sánchez depends on the seven votes that Junts has in the Congress of Deputies. Between the two, there is a coalition of indignities that has been highly damaging to the State, of whose structure only the Crown and the Supreme Court—and the Justice system as a whole—have managed to maintain their constitutional positions. In fact, the fugitive's only direct criticism, in his long message on the X network, was this Friday against the High Court, which he reproached for its "coup-mongering attitude." This is coming from Puigdemont, a rebel against constitutional legality and the national unity of Spain, who limited his references to Pedro Sánchez to a mild complaint about his "passivity," a pure parody of criticism.

The leader of Junts, who would be inane without Sánchez's boundless ambition for power, is collecting concessions that have undermined the state's strength to confront future coup attempts by separatists. To neutralize the sentences imposed by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court, Sánchez pardoned those responsible for the October 1st referendum, albeit with a memoir prepared by his then Minister of Justice, Juan Carlos Campo, in which he declared the amnesty unconstitutional. Since the Puigdemont problem wasn't resolved with the pardon, because he hadn't yet been tried, the government pushed Parliament to abolish the crime of sedition and, then, to reform the crime of embezzlement, all to adapt to that alternative Europe to which Sánchez takes refuge when he wants to perpetrate some legislative trick. Since these reforms failed to take effect and the Supreme Court upheld Puigdemont's prosecution for embezzlement, the government, the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party), and the convicted criminals of the 1-O referendum agreed to an amnesty that has now been ruled on by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Supreme Court has not applied it to those responsible for the 2017 separatist uprising, but which has been approved by the Constitutional Court (CC). Sánchez has not hesitated to place the national government, Parliament, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the State Attorney's Office, and the president of the TC at Puigdemont's service, despite their political insignificance. And we can add the connivance of the Mossos d'Esquadra (Catalan Mossos d'Esquadra), which facilitated Puigdemont's impunity during his brief visit to Barcelona.

But even so, the fugitive remains subject to arrest warrants issued by Judge Pablo Llarena ; he has not been amnestied because the Supreme Court says the Amnesty Law does not extend to embezzlement for profit, such as his; and he is losing his protection as a MEP due to decisions of the European Parliament and the CJEU. What does not depend on Sánchez is the only thing that has worked.