CYPRUS – Israel is a burden, but Cyprus's real wound remains the Turkish occupation.

In recent years, relations between Israel and Turkey have progressively deteriorated, exposing increasingly divergent interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. In Syria , Islamist forces backed by Ankara seized power by force, fueling sectarian dynamics and without any real democratic transition, thus expanding Turkish influence in the region. At the same time, Israel further strained relations with Ankara due to the brutality of its intervention in Gaza , which over time turned into an indiscriminate operation aimed at expelling the population. Meanwhile, Turkey has never ceased its low-intensity war against the Kurds —supported by Israel and the United States—or against the Druze in Syria.

In this complex landscape, the island of Cyprus —divided since 1974 between the Republic of Cyprus (with a Greek Cypriot majority, in the south) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (self-proclaimed and recognized only by Ankara, in the north)—has become one of the main theaters of this conflict. The growing Israeli military presence in southern Cyprus, the deployment of advanced missile systems , and joint exercises with Greek Cypriot forces have provoked harsh reactions from Northern Cyprus, supported by Turkey. At the same time, the massive purchase of real estate by Israeli citizens in the south of the island raises questions about its strategic and geopolitical significance.

Israeli military presence in the Greek Cypriot part

Military cooperation between Israel and the Republic of Cyprus has intensified significantly. Israel has been granted “privileged status” in the use of the Paphos air base, which the Cypriot authorities are also strengthening with the support of the United States ( According to the Greek Cypriot Defense Minister, the Paphos military airport will remain formally dedicated to humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, but will be open to “friendly” countries such as Israel , Jordan, and Egypt for training and cooperation purposes. This choice reflects the deep geographical and strategic proximity: “The Greeks may be our brothers, but Israel is our neighbor: in three minutes, its fighters can be over Cyprus ,” the minister noted, underlining Tel Aviv’s ability to intervene quickly to help Nicosia if necessary . .

Israeli influence also extends to strategic civilian areas. In February 2025, the Greek-Cypriot authorities entrusted the security of the international airports of Larnaca and Paphos to Israeli companies, a move that many in Northern Cyprus interpreted as a further extension of Israel's presence on the island. These initiatives signal Southern Cyprus's growing dependence on Israeli support for security and technology. It should also be remembered that Cyprus already hosts major British installations (Akrotiri Air Base) and collaborates closely with Western countries; Israel's contribution fits into this network of alliances, strengthening the Athens-Nicosia-Tel Aviv axis, which effectively counters Ankara's interests in the region.

Israeli missile systems and joint air defense

In parallel with infrastructure cooperation, Nicosia has begun a significant modernization of its defense system thanks to Israeli military supplies. In 2024, the Cypriot National Guard purchased the sophisticated Barak MX air defense missile system, produced by Israel Aerospace Industries, capable of intercepting air targets and missiles up to 150 km away. According to local media sources, the first Barak MX batteries have already been delivered and put into operation in the south of the island ( This system – described as a true “game-changer” by Cypriot newspapers – can neutralize planes, helicopters, drones, cruise missiles and even some types of ballistic missiles, providing Cyprus with an advanced defensive “dome” that some observers have compared to Israel’s Iron Dome. The acquisition is part of a strategic shift by Cyprus towards Western suppliers: for decades Nicosia had relied on Russian weaponry, but EU sanctions following the war in Ukraine have made it difficult to maintain those systems, prompting the government to “turn to other European Union countries, as well as Israel” to strengthen its “anti-aircraft umbrella” . Initially, the Barak MX will operate alongside the Russian-made Tor-M1 missiles still in service, but in the long term it is intended to completely replace them . . So we can see a certain Western will to progress in this trend, even with an anti-Russian function.

That's not all: press sources report that the Cypriot government is also evaluating the purchase of the famous Israeli Iron Dome system, as part of a multi-level defense strategy against air and missile attacks ( This prospect – coupled with the general strengthening of Southern Cyprus's military capabilities thanks to Israeli support and the recent lifting of the US embargo on arms sales to Nicosia – has caused serious concern in Northern Cyprus, where it is seen as a harbinger of a dangerous arms race on the island.

Joint exercises and field cooperation

The military synergy between Israel and Cyprus is not limited to the purchase of weapons, but is manifested in frequent joint exercises that cement the interoperability of the armed forces. Among these, the series of drills called “Agapinor” stands out, conducted regularly on Cypriot soil. In the Agapinor-2022 exercise, for example, units of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) trained side by side with the Cypriot National Guard in what the IDF called “the largest exercise ever conducted in cooperation with a neighboring country” ( The exercises, which spanned both urban and rural scenarios, included ground troops, air force, navy, and special forces, simulating complex combat situations in mountainous environments similar to those in Lebanon . The IDF emphasized that training on Cypriot soil offers the opportunity to operate in unfamiliar and diverse terrain, improving rapid reaction capabilities in external theaters and long-distance logistics. Not surprisingly, during these large-scale exercises (coordinated with larger drills in Israel, such as “Chariots of Fire”), Israeli forces even simulated strike operations against distant strategic targets—for example, air exercises over the Eastern Mediterranean rehearsing a possible strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.

In addition to Agapinor, periodic air exercises see Israeli fighters operating in the skies of Cyprus and Greece, also taking advantage of the relative proximity and the fewer restrictions imposed by Russian defense systems (once supplied to these countries) during the simulations ( This intense training cooperation has the stated goal of increasing regional deterrence and the ability to confront common threats . For Israel, it means having a friendly space nearby where it can test its forces on diverse terrain and refine its tactics against potential adversaries such as Hezbollah (deployed close to neighboring Lebanon). For Cyprus, it means being able to count on a militarily advanced partner, strengthening its security in the face of the persistent presence of over 30,000 Turkish soldiers stationed north of the Green Line since the 1970s. The result is an increasingly close strategic alignment between Nicosia and Tel Aviv, which is not going unnoticed by Ankara.

Reactions from Northern Cyprus and Turkey

The Turkish Cypriot leadership of the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) has openly expressed opposition to these developments, calling them dangerous and provocative . Ziya Öztürkler, speaker of the Northern Cyprus parliament, strongly condemned the military collaboration between Israel and the Greek Cypriot administration, branding it an “open threat” to the security of the North. In particular, Öztürkler stigmatized the arrival in Southern Cyprus of the new Israeli anti-aircraft systems (notably the Barak MX) , considering it an act that directly threatens Turkish Cypriot sovereignty ( He warned that any military threat to the TRNC will be countered “together with motherland Turkey,” signaling Ankara’s determination to militarily support the North in the event of an escalation.

Northern Cyprus officials emphasize that growing defense ties between the south and Israel—from joint exercises to intelligence sharing, to the lifting of the US arms embargo on Nicosia—risk destabilizing the already precarious regional balance . Northern Cypriot authorities have called the involvement of countries far from the region (such as India , which recently participated in training with Cyprus) in military activities in the Eastern Mediterranean "unacceptable," viewing it as a provocative step that could exacerbate tensions.

Ankara, for its part, accuses Athens and Nicosia of pursuing dangerous rearmament. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has warned that the Republic of Cyprus's rearmament activities are "wrong" and could trigger an arms race on the island. In the past, Turkey managed to block the installation of Russian S-300 missiles in Cyprus (in 1998) by threatening intervention; today it observes with concern the new Israeli missiles aimed a few dozen kilometers from its coasts (even if the real illegitimate one on the island – recognized internationally – is Ankara). Turkish President Erdoğan has also repeatedly verbally attacked Israeli policies, a sign of bilateral relations that have returned to tension after a brief diplomatic thaw ( .

The Cyprus question , frozen for decades, therefore risks becoming further complicated. Northern Cyprus views the alliance between Southern Cyprus and Israel as an attempt to marginalize the TRNC and ignore the rights of Turkish Cypriots, for example, in access to offshore natural resources. Israeli influence is perceived as part of a broader strategy to exclude Turkey from the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean—consider the EastMed Gas Forum and the EastMed gas pipeline project, supported by Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, which Ankara opposes because it sees it as cut off from new energy corridors. Faced with signs of possible strategic encirclement , Northern Cyprus leaders declare they are ready to "turn every negotiating table against the TRNC" in order to defend their own entity, in close coordination with Turkey.

Interestingly, the Northern Cypriot authorities have responded not only rhetorically but also with concrete measures. Following reports of Israeli initiatives in the north (such as marina construction projects and land acquisitions), the TRNC government introduced new restrictions on the sale of property to foreigners in 2023 ( These measures aim to curb the expansion of non-local actors in areas considered sensitive , protecting the sovereignty and resources of the Turkish Cypriot side. In practice, foreign buyers in Northern Cyprus now face very strict limits on the number of properties and the size of land they can own—a change largely motivated by fears of geopolitical interference through real estate investments.

Israeli real estate boom and its geopolitical implications

In addition to its military-diplomatic nature, Israel's presence in Cyprus is manifested through a less visible but highly significant channel: the real estate market . In recent years , thousands of Israeli citizens have purchased homes, land, and commercial properties, especially in the Greek Cypriot part of the country , taking advantage of the favorable climate for foreign investment. This trend, however, has sparked heated internal debate in Southern Cyprus, with accusations and fears about the potential impact of what some see as a veritable "economic colonization."

The main Cypriot opposition party, AKEL (left-leaning), has raised the alarm, calling the massive purchase and sale of real estate by Israelis a serious risk to national security ( Speaking at a recent party congress, Secretary General Stefanos Stefanou compared the phenomenon to Israel's settlement tactics in the Palestinian territories, warning that it could lead to the creation of foreign-influenced "ghettos" on Cypriot soil. " They are taking the country away from us ," Stefanou said, accusing the government of laxity and calling for tighter controls on land sales to non-Cypriots. The AKEL leader cited the appearance of "Zionist schools and synagogues" in some Cypriot locations as evidence of a larger plan behind the Israeli arrivals. Going further, he claimed that Israeli buyers are also eyeing land in the occupied (Turkish-held) north , insinuating a coordinated plan to position themselves at strategic points on the island. “If we don’t act now, one day we will discover that this country is no longer ours,” was his warning.

These statements have sparked mixed reactions. On the one hand, civil society figures and some independent analysts acknowledge that an uncontrolled influx of foreign capital into the real estate market can have distorting effects – for example, driving up prices, creating elite enclaves and potentially exposing Cyprus to external pressure. On the other hand, the government and pro-government circles have criticized AKEL's speech, believing it to be a xenophobic conspiracy theory. Israel's ambassador to Nicosia , Oren Anolik, reacted strongly to Stefanou's words, condemning "the emergence of anti-Semitic rhetoric that is completely unusual for Cyprus ," disguised as political concern. Without naming AKEL, Anolik warned that reviving stereotypes and conspiracies about "Zionist plans" undermines coexistence and evokes "the dark patterns of the European past." The ambassador emphasized that in a democratic and open country like Cyprus, it is normal for foreign citizens to invest, reside, and open schools or places of worship in compliance with the law—this is a sign of pluralism, not a threat. He also recalled the "deep and growing friendship" between Israel and Cyprus , based on shared values ​​and thriving people-to-people relations, urging that "invented narratives about plans for conquest not destroy social cohesion."

Cyprus has always been a disputed land and a place of encounters/clash of civilizations

Representatives of other Cypriot parties and centrist media have also criticized AKEL for its alarmist tone, fearing damage to the country's reputation as a safe destination for foreign investment. The debate, however, remains heated. Deep identity issues are emerging: Cyprus has always been a contested land and a site of encounters/clash of civilizations , and the idea of ​​new, economically powerful "foreign" communities on the territory strikes a nerve among the population.

But what are the real numbers of this Israeli presence? Official figures indicate around 2,500 Israeli citizens permanently residing in Southern Cyprus ( . However, local observers estimate that the actual number – including those who stay for long periods or have dual residency – is much higher, between 12,000 and 15,000 people . This growing community has recent roots: in 2018 there were just 6,500 Israeli residents, which implies a doubling in less than a decade ( According to press investigations, since 2021 Israeli citizens have purchased approximately 4,000 properties in the Greek Cypriot sector ( ) . The most popular areas are the coastal cities of Limassol , Paphos , and Larnaca , especially tourist resorts such as Pyla, Ormideia, Perivolia, and other areas near the sea or airports. These are often high-profile investments: large developments housing luxury resorts, spas, and gated and guarded residential complexes—effectively self-sufficient enclaves catering to wealthy foreign clients. A Cypriot real estate consultant, Loizos Loizou, explained to the Cyprus Mail that “Israelis tend to buy large plots of land, with spas and resorts, real gated communities… Pyla has become their main hub.”

The reasons for this boom go beyond simple financial investment. Several geopolitical and social factors are fueling it. A first wave of arrivals occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic (2020-21) : many wealthy Israelis, dissatisfied with the lockdowns at home, found temporary refuge in Cyprus (EU, efficient healthcare, lower density), ending up buying second homes, especially in holiday resorts ( A second wave is linked to the 2023 Israeli political crisis : as mass protests erupted in Israel against the Netanyahu government's controversial judicial reforms, many citizens began to "safeguard" their assets and families abroad, seeing Cyprus—a 40-minute flight away—as an ideal Plan B. Finally, the third wave (2023-2025) is primarily security-related: after the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, and the ensuing war in Gaza, Israel's sense of vulnerability has increased. The hypothetical risk of a widening of the conflict (perhaps involving Iran or Lebanon) has pushed thousands of Israelis to relocate, at least temporarily, to Cyprus. Organizations like Chabad report having assisted tens of thousands of Israeli refugees passing through the island during times of crisis—many of whom have subsequently decided to settle there. Simply put, Cyprus is understandably seen by some segments of Israeli society as a “safety valve” : a nearby, culturally welcoming, stable territory outside the immediate reach of Middle Eastern conflicts.

On the other hand, in an increasingly unstable context, the West seems to be moving according to a logic that prioritizes economic profit and a project of anthropological engineering of society. On the one hand, it promotes models of social control ; on the other, it welcomes the influx of masses of individuals not so much for humanitarian reasons as to shape a new type of human being: stateless, uprooted, devoid of faith and traditional values ​​to defend . In this scenario, how could one condemn the choice of many Israeli citizens to take refuge in a land perceived as safe, outside their own country (while maintaining ties and proximity), marked by decades of war and now palpable insecurity?

Cyprus, the forgotten occupation: the Turkish flag still flies in the heart of the EU

From a geopolitical perspective, the phenomenon of Israeli real estate purchases in Cyprus has significance that goes beyond the private sphere. For Israel, the presence of a strong community on the island represents a strategic foothold within the European Union and a secure outpost between the Levant, the Suez Canal, and the Aegean. Although formally these are individual initiatives, their concentration in sensitive areas—such as near Larnaca airport or critical infrastructure—suggests potential additional intelligence and logistics channels . Not surprisingly, Haaretz revealed that Israeli intelligence services have already used Cyprus as a staging area for covert operations and "safe houses."

For Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, the influx of Israelis into the south is interpreted as confirmation of an "unholy Greek-Jewish alliance" against them. In their view, Israel is turning Cyprus into a safe haven, an "Israeli back garden," from which to project military and economic influence. Hence the narrative that Cypriot sovereignty is progressively eroding.

However, these accusations ignore a fundamental fact: half the island has been militarily occupied by Turkey since 1974 , which created a Northern "Republic" recognized only by Ankara . Development there is a marked difference compared to the South: while the Republic of Cyprus (an EU member) has prospered, investing in infrastructure, tourism, and finance, the North has remained isolated, backward, and marked by a progressive erasure of its cultural and religious heritage. Dozens of Byzantine churches and monasteries have been abandoned or transformed into mosques, warehouses, or stables, testifying to a systematic failure to preserve the island's Christian past .

In this context, fears of excessive Israeli influence—though understandable—are not comparable to the real and tangible threat posed by Turkey . Ankara has never hidden its aims: it aims to reproduce an expansive neo-Ottomanism , manifested as much in Syria and Libya as in Cyprus, accompanied by rigid ideological indoctrination.

For Nicosia, therefore, the alliance with Israel is not an optional extra but a strategic necessity . Positioned in the Western camp, and with the constant presence of the Turkish army in the north, Cyprus cannot afford to reject a partner offering security, technology, and military cooperation. Israeli moves—from controlling airport security to deploying missile systems—are seen by the Republic of Cyprus as a legitimate strengthening of its defense , while Ankara interprets them as hostile acts that marginalize Turkish Cypriots.

The risk is that the island will become a new point of friction between Turkey and Israel, exacerbating a conflict that has been frozen for half a century. However, it remains clear that the real occupation is Turkey's , which weighs on an EU member state and limits its full sovereignty. The challenge for Southern Cyprus will be to cultivate the benefits of cooperation with Israel without falling into escalationist tactics, but also to remind the world that the island still lives under threat from a neighbor that considers the expansion of its dominion legitimate.

Ultimately, Cyprus remains a microcosm of the great rivalries of the Eastern Mediterranean. But while Israel is a sometimes cumbersome ally, the danger for the Cypriot people comes above all from the Turkish occupation , which continues to deny reconciliation, destroy the island's religious past, and cultivate a project of regional hegemony that knows no borders.

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Sources: Daily Sabah, Reuters, Anadolu Agency, Cyprus Mail, Hürriyet Daily News, Ynet, Cyprus News Agency, official statements.