Salvini, Macron, and Meloni's break: when the king is naked

“Take the tram,” Salvini told Macron. A Milanese expression (“ taches al tra m”), translated in his colorful style: “You go if you want. Put on your helmet, your jacket, your rifle and go to Ukraine.”

France has summoned the Italian ambassador to Paris "following Salvini's unacceptable comments" against Macron for his support for troops in Ukraine. "Put on your helmet, your jacket, and go to Ukraine," the deputy prime minister said. #ANSA https://t.co/I4foj5rsON

— ANSA Agency (@Agenzia_Ansa) August 23, 2025

These words provoked an immediate reaction from the Elysée Palace, which summoned the Italian ambassador to Paris. There, the tone was harsh: statements described as "unacceptable." A diplomatic incident? Perhaps. But at the same time, they were yet another confirmation of an unrealistic climate, in which anyone who speaks what the majority of Italians think is branded a "provocateur" or "intemperate," while the official narrative remains impenetrable, locked away in a castle of mystification.

At this point, the inevitable question arises: is Salvini really simply a drunkard, a diplomatic disrupter? Or does the problem lie deeper, in the overall posture of the Italian government, and in particular of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, which appears not only inadequate but actually inconsistent with the facts?

To answer this question, it is useful to briefly retrace his political trajectory on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

From critical pragmatism to a change of direction 2014: a time for caution

In March 2014, faced with the Crimean crisis, Giorgia Meloni tweeted: "It's right that the people express their opinion on the future of Crimea with a referendum." These words acknowledged, to some extent, a principle of self-determination, certainly not a condemnation of Moscow.

#Ukraine : It is right that the people express their opinion on the future of Crimea with a referendum.

— Giorgia Meloni (@GiorgiaMeloni) March 1, 2014

That same year, the Brothers of Italy party opposed sanctions against Russia, deeming them harmful to the Italian economy and ineffective in changing the international balance of power. In Parliament, Meloni declared that it made no sense to force Kiev's entry into the EU and NATO, proposing neutral status for Ukraine, a "bridge between Europe and Russia."

And again on the EU/NATO and on the issue of Ukraine's "neutrality", one of the points requested by Russia in the Chamber (October 2014) Meloni argued that it made no sense to "force" Kiev's entry into the EU and NATO , proposing a neutral status for Ukraine, a bridge between the EU and Russia ; she also criticized Europe's alignment with the US line of the time using these exact words:

“In my opinion, if the European Union had a foreign policy, if the European Union did not simply carry out the orders of the well-deserved (ironic) Nobel Peace Prize winner Barack Obama, then the European Union would know that it makes no sense today to force Ukraine's entry into the European Union and NATO , inevitably bringing about a crisis with the Russian Federation at the exact moment when we need the Russian Federation to fight the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.”

Ultimately, Meloni until 2021 – in various public interventions – has shown a positive cultural-value tone towards Russia ; this picture is widely documented by press reviews and critical reconstructions (see ,

In short, Meloni in 2014 was critical of Atlanticist and sanctionist tendencies, aware that excessive rigidity would have enormous costs for Italy. In short: skeptical of sanctions , cautious about NATO/EU enlargement to the East, open to the Crimean referendum issue; and careful attention to the economic damage to Italy.

After February 24, 2022: the caesura

Everything changed with the Russian invasion. As opposition leader first, and then prime minister, Meloni reversed her stance:

a) Condemnation of the invasion and sending of weapons. As opposition leader (February-September 2022) and then as prime minister (from October 22, 2022), Meloni condemned the Russian aggression, sided with Kiev, and supported the sending of military aid . Reuters summarizes her position ahead of the 2022 election and in the first months of her government.

b) Trip to Kyiv and "just peace." In February 2023, he visited Kyiv and reiterated: "No unjust peace can be imposed on Ukraine; any agreement must have the consent of the Ukrainian people." (Official communication from Palazzo Chigi).

c) Bilateral Security Agreement between Italy and Ukraine (February 24, 2024). Italy signs a long-term security agreement in Kiev that commits Rome to military, financial, and training support (following the G7 Vilnius Declaration). The official text is public. And

d) Decrees and extensions for supplies. The government extends the authorization for sending military aid until 2024 without having to pass through Parliament on a case-by-case basis; institutional and press releases and reports document this.

e) 2025: "Just Peace," G7 Convergence, and Guarantees. In the context of talks in Washington with Zelensky and European leaders, Meloni insists on unity and justice as conditions for peace; the international and Italian press reported her words. Furthermore, Italian support for a guarantees scheme has leaked that—in the event of a new invasion after an agreement—would provide a 24-hour window for allies to decide on deployment (Bloomberg news reported by the Kyiv Independent ). , ,

However, the Russian invasion, in itself, is not sufficient to logically justify such a radical reversal of positions, to the point of contradicting previous judgments based on different observations. If, for example, in 2014 a referendum in Ukraine to resolve a question of sovereignty was considered legitimate, a war sparked by the same issues cannot obliterate the need for a diplomatic solution along the same lines that were considered reasonable at the time.

But that's not all: in 2023, Meloni even went so far as to declare: " We were wrong ," referring to the Western response of 2014. Not because, as she claimed then, it had been excessive. But because—in her opinion—it had been too weak. The reversal is complete: from "we did too much" to "we did too little."

Here we see the logical fracture . In 2023 , speaking at the Crimea Platform , Meloni states that the Western reaction of 2014 was “insufficient and wrong” : “We were wrong.” It is a retrospective rereading opposite to her 2014 line (no to sanctions, no to forcing the EU/NATO), shifting the judgment from “we have made damaging/exaggerated choices” to “ we have done too little ”. (

From a historiographical point of view, the thesis that the conflict began in 2014 is supported by scholars such as Jeffrey Sachs , who places its origin in the Maidan crisis, the conflict in Donbass and NATO-Russia dynamics. ( And

Here the deepest contradiction emerges. Economist Jeffrey Sachs and many independent observers point out that the war began not in 2022, but in 2014: with the Maidan coup, the war in Donbas, the sabotage of the Minsk agreements, and NATO expansion to the East.

If we accept this interpretation—now widely documented—it becomes even more difficult to understand Meloni's metamorphosis. Because in 2014, she argued that Ukraine shouldn't be forced into NATO and the EU, and that sanctions were an own goal. Today, she argues the exact opposite.

Reason of state or reversal?

Can we speak of "reasons of state"? Certainly:

• Italy wanted to ensure Atlantic credibility at a time of open war.

• Meloni had to distinguish herself from her coalition partners (Salvini and Berlusconi), who are notoriously pro-Russian.

• Rome chose to continue with Draghi and the EU-NATO framework, avoiding ruptures that could have isolated Italy in Europe.

Specifically, here's what's really changed (and why):

a) The international framework after 2022.

• Italy has aligned its posture with the EU/NATO and the G7, signing security agreements with Kiev (on the G7 model). ( And

• Italian diplomacy – even as president of the G7 – has invested in the narrative of a “just peace” : negotiations, yes, but without concessions imposed on Kiev (therefore leaving everything to Kiev’s right to decide whatever it wants, but with Italian support) and with lasting guarantees (which today mean indiscriminate rearmament, violating Russia’s requests for security guarantees). And

b) Internal political factors (“reasons of state”).

• The need to distinguish himself from his ally Salvini (for years a staunchly pro-Russian) and from Berlusconi's ambiguity, building Atlanticist credibility. His first moves as prime minister aimed precisely at this (regardless of whether the country that established NATO, the United States, with Trump, differed in its judgment on the war).

• Continuity of institutional supply chain with Draghi (sanctions/armaments), then formalized with the extensions of the "Ukraine" decrees. (

c) Rhetorical shift to 2014. The phrase "We were wrong" reinterprets 2014 as an error of underestimation (not excess), legitimizing ex post today's line (arms + guarantees). It is here, in my opinion, that the ambivalence emerges: Meloni-2014 denounced the Euro-Atlantic gamble and the "masochistic" sanctions; Meloni-2023/25 maintains that too little was done then, so today we need to push forward (sending weapons, ten-year agreements, "just peace"). , And

But all this isn't enough to explain such a radical reversal. In 2014, Meloni considered caution and balancing Moscow's position to be common sense; today, she considers that same caution an unforgivable mistake. This isn't simply a matter of updating: it's a retrospective rewriting of history.

With Trump in the White House: truly "the emperor is naked"

The paradox becomes even more evident now that the United States, under Donald Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance, is opening channels of dialogue with Putin.

My objection here is clear: if Trump's USA is signaling openness to negotiations (or at least a different positioning), why does Rome remain extremist ? Recent events speak for themselves:

• Trump-Putin (Alaska 2025) : Summit fails to reach an agreement; subsequent trilateral meeting with Zelensky is considered. European reactions: support for robust guarantees and a "just peace." Meloni places herself here. , And

• Meloni in Washington with Zelensky and EU leaders: she reiterates " unity and justice " and the continuity of support for Kiev. (

• The “24-hour” guarantee scheme (reported by Bloomberg): a sign that Italy supports a strong post-agreement deterrent system , not a “peace at all costs”. (

Political translation: even if the White House is talking to Moscow today, the Italian (and mainstream EU) line remains " negotiate yes, but from a position of strength ", with an umbrella of guarantees and Ukrainian rearmament .

Yet, in this scenario, Italy continues to advocate for a "just peace" which, in effect, means perpetual militarization: ten-year agreements, security guarantees, 24-hour response times for new armed missions.

While even the United States is showing pragmatic openness, Rome remains stuck in an extremist posture that no longer even has the support of Washington.

In light of these facts, it is clear that Meloni displays several contradictions:

• On consistency. The break exists and is substantial : from 2014 to 2021, Meloni criticized Euro-Atlantic pressures and sanctions ; from 2022 onwards, she embraced an assertive Atlanticism , justifying it with the idea that the West did too little in 2014. This reversal cannot be explained by a simple "updating of the facts," because it retroactively rewrites the judgment on what the mistake of 2014 was.

• On "reasons of state." The need for international credibility (EU/NATO/G7), internal competition with pro-Russian coalition partners, and the need to preserve Italy's Atlanticist profile explain much of the metamorphosis. But they don't address the ambivalence in communication: the emphasis on "just peace" coexists with arms shipments , ten-year agreements , and potentially escalatory guarantees .

• On the thesis "the war began in 2014." This is a historically sound interpretation, shared by scholars like Sachs ; for this very reason, it would have been consistent to expect a more forthright Italian narrative regarding multilevel responsibilities (coups, Donbass, Minsk, etc.). The current government framework, however, maintains the " peace yes, but only if just " bias, avoiding a truly critical review of the pre-2022 NATO/EU errors that Meloni herself denounced in 2014.

Conclusion: it's a question of truth

The Salvini-Macron affair is just the tip of the iceberg. Behind this folkloristic episode—which nevertheless had the merit of voicing out loud what many Italians think—lies a deeper issue: the coherence (or incoherence) of Italian foreign policy.

Giorgia Meloni, who in 2014 denounced "masochistic" sanctions and Atlanticist overreach, has now transformed into a champion of weapons, security guarantees, and a "just peace." A metamorphosis that can be justified as reasons of state, but which in reality appears to be a true reversal.

The "break" exists, and it's political, not just moral. The fact that the US (Trump) is pushing for negotiations today doesn't change Rome's position: tough guarantees and deterrence are a prerequisite for any agreement.

The result is that the truth is bent to the needs of the moment. No longer errors of excess, but of deficiency. No longer prudence, but escalation. No longer balance, but extremism.

The reality, however, is different: the king is naked . And Italian politics, rather than acknowledging it, continues to play a script that no longer convinces anyone.

Reference documentation:

• 2014 – Tweet about the referendum in Crimea.

• 2014 – Criticism of sanctions and EU/NATO enlargement: videos and reconstructions. ( ,

• 2022 – Post-invasion arms/sanctions support. (

• 2023 – Trip to Kyiv; “no to an unjust peace”. (

• 2024 – Bilateral Security Agreement between Italy and Ukraine (text). (

• 2023-2024 – Extensions of weapons shipments/Italy decrees. (

• 2023 – “We were wrong” on Western response in 2014. (

• 2025 – Washington: “unity and justice”; framework for talks with Trump. ( ,

• 2025 – Guarantee scheme with a decision “within 24 hours” (Bloomberg). (

• 2014→ – Historiographical reading “the war begins in 2014” (Jeffrey Sachs). ( And