Too Close to Win? The Electoral Model for the City Council

The fiercest battles in the 2025 Local Elections, where the top two parties nationwide were separated by less than one percentage point in 15 municipalities, are not only a reflection of political polarization, but a clear symptom that the model for electing City Council members is outdated.
The difference of less than 0.30 pp in Braga and Caminha demonstrates that the weight of the current presidential system, centered on the figure of the president, rests too often on a thread, which compromises the robust executive legitimacy required.
In the specific case of Braga, this is even more pronounced because in addition to the difference of minus 1 pp compared to the second-placed team, there is a difference of less than 5 pp compared to the third-placed team.
As an example of the severity of this fragility, 86 municipal council elections were held in the North Region. Pending final consolidation of the data, it is known that more than 12% of these elections had a vote difference of less than 5% between the top two candidates. This, in some cases, can mean differences of a few hundred, or even dozens, of votes.
This concentration of such tight results in a region of high administrative complexity exacerbates the issue of the executive's precarious legitimacy.
The 1976 logic of attracting the maximum political sensibilities to the executive branch through the "direct" election of the president has lost its raison d'être. Today, it generates more instability and fosters minority governance or majority governance through fragile agreements than the much-desired stable multiparty system.
In fact, this system may be responsible for the accentuation of party bipolarization since the PSD, alone or in coalition, had 46 chambers (≈53.5%), the PS, alone or in coalition, had 36 chambers, the CDS and the “independents” 2 chambers each.
It is essential to reinforce the parliamentary aspect in municipalities.
The solution involves changing the electoral system: the election of the Mayor should be indirect, emerging from the composition of the Municipal Assembly. This necessarily implies strengthening the powers of the Municipal Assembly, transforming it into the true engine of oversight and political legitimacy.
The Assembly, as a body representing the municipal political spectrum, would have increased powers to review the choices made, ensuring that the President represents a stable majority in the deliberative body.
This reform is not a matter of ideology, but of administrative and democratic effectiveness. The results of the last elections, with several municipalities electing a new party and an increasing number of "Independents," confirm that the executive branch's support base must be more representative and less personal.
The time for the kind but misplaced intention of 1976 has passed. The complexity of 21st-century local government demands a model that promotes governmental stability and democratic accountability, and strengthening the Municipal Assembly is a decisive step in that direction.
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