World Health Organization: How China Wants to Fill the Void Left by the US

May 2025, Geneva. During the 78th World Health Assembly, Chinese Vice President Liu Guozhong announced an unprecedented commitment from the Chinese government: $500 million over the next five years to support the World Health Organization (WHO).

The timing is no coincidence. A few months earlier, the Trump administration had confirmed drastic cuts in funding for the United Nations and its specialized agencies, also significantly reducing the US contribution to the WHO, historically the highest of all member countries.

In 2022 alone, the United States contributed €679.6 million to the WHO, equivalent to approximately one-third of Member States' direct contributions and one-fifth of its total resources, which also includes donations from private entities. Over the past two years, the United States has covered 75% of the costs of programs to combat AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases and more than half of the costs of combating tuberculosis.

For the WHO, already grappling with a budget crisis and forced to ask the international community for an additional $1.5 billion in support, China's promise represents a breath of fresh air. For global geopolitics, it's a clear signal: Beijing is ready to fill the gap left by Washington. In recent years, China had already become the second-largest contributor to the UN's regular budget and the largest permanent member of the Security Council in terms of personnel and resources allocated to peacekeeping missions.

The United States, on the other hand, has progressively reduced its financial participation , citing the risk of "disproportionate costs" and structural inefficiencies. The new cuts have naturally created a vacuum of power and resources in the multilateral system, a vacuum that Beijing has interpreted as an opportunity: to increase its influence in international institutions through funding, diplomatic presence, and leadership in UN agencies. According to Liu Guozhong, the half-billion contribution aims to "strengthen the role of the WHO" and "promote international cooperation" to address global health emergencies. His words also imply an implicit criticism of "unilateralism" and the politicization of healthcare.

The move is part of a broader strategy : to consolidate China's image as a responsible leader and a credible alternative to a West perceived as divided and less committed to multilateralism. This ambition should be interpreted not only in terms of numbers, but as part of a specific geopolitical and diplomatic strategy that Beijing has developed over the past decades. Strengthening China's role in multilateral agencies, particularly the World Health Organization, is a key component of a broader vision that sees international cooperation as a tool for consolidating power and influence, rather than simply a gesture of "aid." This is where China's model of humanitarian diplomacy comes into play, which differs significantly from traditional Western forms of cooperation and is based on principles such as reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual benefit.

To understand the scope of the operation, it's useful to look beyond the numbers. As anthropologist and researcher Costanza Franceschini , who studies Chinese infrastructural development abroad, especially in Africa, and relations between China and the Global South, explains, the increased funding to the WHO fits perfectly into the broader framework of China's three-pillar approach to development cooperation.

First, South-South Cooperation, in which Beijing presents itself as an "equal partner" (pingdeng huli de huoban, 平等互利的伙伴), rejecting the "donor" label. " This is a model," explains Franceschini, "that explicitly opposes the Western paradigm of 'development aid,' traditionally tied to forms of financial assistance conditioned on political and economic reforms in recipient countries. In line with this vision, China avoids adopting the distinction between 'donor' and 'recipient' countries, preferring to emphasize reciprocity in cooperation."

The second pillar, non-interference in the internal affairs of partner countries, avoiding political conditionality, and the third, mutual benefit, which prioritizes projects that bring concrete benefits to both parties, help reinforce the idea of ​​a partnership rather than a donation. This framework is based on an inclusive narrative, emphasizing expressions such as "win-win cooperation," "friendly collaboration," and "co-development." This model of humanitarian diplomacy, already evident in the Belt and Road Initiative and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, could now find a new multilateral platform in the WHO.

"The increased funding for the WHO and China's growing involvement in UN agencies are certainly part of a broader strategy to strengthen its legitimacy and influence in the global multilateral system," Franceschini confirms. However, "it is important to emphasize that this commitment complements—and does not replace—a parallel strategy of building alternative multilateral spaces."

In addition to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—which have been joined by other members in the BRICS+ format), China has promoted and consolidated several multilateral platforms, such as FOCAC (Forum on China–Africa Cooperation). Launched in 2000, it is the main instrument for dialogue and cooperation between China and African countries. In this sense, China's strengthening presence at the WHO is not an isolated incident , but rather the consistent continuation of a strategy already tested in other multilateral contexts. As with the BRICS and FOCAC, Beijing also tends to combine financial commitment and diplomatic visibility in the healthcare sector, seeking to shape the agenda in a manner consistent with its geopolitical and narrative priorities.

For the World Health Organization, China's contribution could mean greater financial stability, but also Beijing's growing influence on health priorities , with the risk that resource allocation could favor projects in aligned countries or China's strategic trading partners.

In the United States, the move was seen as further evidence of Washington's progressive retreat from international leadership. According to analysts and think tanks—from the Heritage Foundation to the Stimson Center—Beijing's massive financial support for the WHO is part of a "cash-for-clout" strategy, using funding to gain political influence, with the risk of shifting the agency's decision-making axis increasingly toward China.

In Europe, reactions oscillate between caution and the pursuit of a mediating role . For Italy and the EU, the challenge will be to preserve standards of transparency and multilateral governance without giving China a monopoly on the global health agenda.

Beijing's announcement isn't just a question of funding: it's a declaration of geopolitical ambition. The vacuum left by the United States offers China the opportunity to consolidate its role as an indispensable player in the UN system, not only in healthcare but in all humanitarian cooperation. At the same time, China's intervention allows the survival of WHO programs and interventions that would otherwise have been lost as a result of the US withdrawal.

In the years to come, it will be important to observe how the WHO addresses this evolution in its financial structure. The organization has always depended on the support of major powers, but the progressive shift in its main funders could influence both global perception and the health priorities and strategies adopted.

© Copyright World Health Organization (WHO), 2025. All Rights /Pierre Albouy